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HoLDING CoMPANY AcT - "CoNTROLLING INFLUENCE" - Most
new and revolutionary statutes for the regulation of interstate trade
and commerce cause both lawyers· and businessmen many headaches
before their terms become fixed in meaning by judicial interpretation.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of r935 1 is no exception.

1 49 Stat. L. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 79 (hereinafter sometimes called "the act").
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Difficult questions of interpretation are bound to arise under a statute
of such a complicated nature, leaving, as it does, so much to the discretion of administrative officers. In the spring of this year the problem
of what is a "controlling influence" was brought to light by two cases.
While each case raised the question in a situation totally different from
the other, fundamentally it was the same in each.

r.
Detroit Edison Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission 2
Section 2 (a) ( 8) 8 of the act defines "subsidiary company" as any
company ten per cent or more of the voting securities of which are
held by a holding company. However, if the commission shall determine such company not to be subject to a controlling influence
2

(C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 730, cert. den. (U.S. 1941) 10 U.S. L.
3119, 3123.
8
" 'Subsidiary company' of a specified holding company means"(A) any company IO per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities
of which are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote,
by s\ich holding company (or by a company that is a subsidiary company of such holding
company by virtue of this clause or clause (B), unless the Commission, as hereinafter provided, by order declares such company not to be a subsidiary company of such
holding company; and
"(B) any person the management or policies of which the Commission, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, determines to be subject to a controlling influence,.
directly or indirectly, by such holding company (either alone or pursuant to an
arrangement or understanding with one or more other persons) so as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers
that such person be subject to the obligations, duties, and liabilities imposed in this
title upon subsidiary companies of holding companies.
"The Commission, upon application, shall by order declare that a company is not a
subsidiary company of a specified holding company under clause (A) if the Commission
finds that (i) the applicant is not controlled, directly or indirectly, by such holding company (either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with one or more
other persons) either through one or more intermediary personsorbyanymeans or device
whatsoever, (ii) the applicant is not an intermediary company through which such control
of another company is exercised, and (iii) the management or policies of the applicant
are not subject to a controlling influence, directly or indirectly, by such holding company (either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with one or more
other persons) so as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors or consumers that the applicant be subject to the obligations,
duties, and liabilities imposed in this title upon subsidiary companies of holding companies." 49 Stat. L. 807 (1935), 15 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 79b(a)(8). (Italics
added.)
It will be noticed that§ 2 (a) (8) (B) uses the word "person."§ (2) (a) (1)
of the act defines "person" as "an individual or company." Under sec. 2 (a) (2) "company'' includes a corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, "or an organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not; or any receiver .•• of any of the foregoing..••"
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which can be exercised by the holding company, then the commission
may by order declare such company not to be a subsidiary company.
Pursuant to this section the Detroit Edison Company applied to
the Securities and Exchange Commission for an order declaring it not
to be a subsidiary of the American Light & Traction Company, Gardner
& Brown,4 the North American Company, the United Light & Power
Company, or the United Light & Railways Co. 5
As to North American the petition was denied. It was this ruling
by the commission which was in controversy before the circuit court of
appeals. The court affirmed the order. North American presently owns
19.28 per cent of Detroit Edison stock. 6 North American caused the
organization of Detroit Edison in 1903. A guiding figure in this organization was Mr. Alex Dow. Mr. Dow had managed Detroit Edison's predecessors. North American paid Mr. Dow $10,000 for his
services in obtaining the stock of Detroit Edison's predecessors for
North American and in organizing Detroit Edison.
The record then shows a long history of intercorporate relationship between Detroit Edison and North American. Mr. Dow became
president of Detroit Edison and is now on its board, although he is no
longer its president. North American has at all times had directors and
officers on the Detroit Edison board. Two members of Detroit Edison's
present board were on the original board named by North American,
while two others are directly associated with North American at the
present time. The board consists of seven members.
The court stated, however, that there was no evidence that Detroit
Edison was directly or indirectly controlled by North American. The
commission and the court based the decision on the ground that clause
(iii) of section 2 (a) (8) of the act was not complied with because
the petitioner had failed to sustain the burden of proof that it was not
subject to a controlling influence exercised by North American. Much
weight was attached to the history of control exercised before 1935.
Since Gardner & Brown had disposed of its Detroit Edison stock, the petition
was granted as to it, seemingly without opposition.
5 "The American Light & Traction Company is a subsidiary of the United Light
& Railways Company, which in turn is a subsidiary of United Light and Power Company." 119 F. (2d) 730 at 733. These companies will be hereinafter sometimes called
"United." The American Light and Traction Co. owns 20.27o/o of the Detroit
Edison stock. However, it was shown that United has never at any time been granted
representation on Detroit Edison's board, but was at all times excluded from any
participation in Detroit Edison affairs. Thus the petition was granted as to United,
subject to certain conditions.
6 In its opinion the court gave a detailed statement of the facts, including the
history of North American-Detroit Edison relations since the latter's organization. This
statement is a reasonable facsimile of the statement found in the commission's opinion.
Matter of the Detroit Edison Co., 7 S. E. C. 968 (1940).
4
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Detroit Edison based its case upon the absolute absence of tangible
intercorporate dealings, transactions and relations between itself and
North American since 1935. In answering this argument the court
said: "There is no showing that its [North American's] latent power to
resume such control has been extinguished." 1
In short, the decision is based upon two factors, viz., history, and
the personal friendship and long association of certain Detroit Edison
directors and officers with those of North American. The court's statement above must have referred to this intangible personal factor because, it must be remembered, United owns more of petitioner's stock
than does North American.
This is the first case under sections 2 (a) ( 7) 8 and 2 (a) ( 8) which
has reached the courts. It indicates that the courts may allow the commission to interpret these sections even more broadly than they are
written ( and they are written very broadly). For instance, under clause
(iii) of section 2 (a) (8) (B) the statutory phraseology is "are not
subject to a controlling influence." This would seem to connote a
present control presently exercised. The court, however, talks of
"latent power to resume control," thus indicating that a present control
is unnecessary. If Congress intended the interpretation invoked in the
instant case it should have said "are not susceptible to becoming subject to a controlling influence," or are not "likely to become subject," etc. The court seems to have interpreted "subject to" control as
meaning possibility of control. This interpretation carried to its logical
conclusion reaches the epitome of absurdity. By this reasoning if North
American had sold all of its Detroit Edison stock the holding companysubsidiary relationship might be continued so long as North American
remained financially able to repurchase the stock. Obviously the court
intended to base its decision on the ground that there was a likelihood
of influence being exercised by North American, not that there was a
mere possibility.
The last interpretation is indefinite enough. However, it affords
a basis upon which lawyers may hazard an opinion in advising a client.
The act requires the commission to lay great emphasis on intangible
relationships and influence which may result in "control." In an inquiry as to the existence of such intangibles, clear and convincing proof
is all but impossible to obtain and, in the normal case, will not be
obtained. The commission faces the further difficulty that the actual
facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the applicant. So the
1 Detroit Edison Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (C. C. A. 6th,
1941) 119 F. (2d) 730 at 739.
8 Sec. 2 (a) ( 7) defines "holding company'' but the tests and exceptions therein
are identical with § 2 (a) (8). For the present purposes they may be considered as
identical.
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commission has adopted the rule of probabilities in construing the act.
From the facts as stated in the instant case the result does not seem
unreasonable, particularly when we remember that two Detroit Edison directors are also North American o:fficers.9
As already stated, this is the only case under this provision of the
act which has reached the courts. The administrative holdings are no
great aid in construing the statute. However, it is possible to draw
certain general conclusions from the holdings. For instance, where the
utility's stock is held in a voting trust and the trustees are officers,
directors, or employees of holding companies, a "controlling influence"
has been found to exist.10 When more than the statutory ten per cent
of petitioner's stock is held by one holding company but the lion's
share of petitioner's stock is owned by a second holding company which
exercises control, it has been found that the first holding company exercises no controlling influence within the meaning of the act.11 In the
converse of this last situation (petition by a holding company that a
"subsidiary" be declared not to be a subsidiary where petitioner owns
more than ten per cent of the subsidiary's stock but another company,
or other companies, are in the driver's seat by virtue of their larger
holdings) a like result is reached. 12 Where the holding company or
operating company, as the case may be, has ceased to engage actively
in business due to bankruptcy or the leasing of all its property, and
has become a dormant corporate shell, it is held that an exception may
be granted under sections 2 (a) ( 7) or ( 8) .13 Perhaps these decisions
rest on the ground that it is not "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors or consumers" 14 that the
petitioner be subject to the liabilities and duties under the act. This is
the ground for exempting the case of an American holding company
with a foreign subsidiary from the provisions of the act.15
9
The court also. emphasized Mr. Dow's continued position of dominance in
Detroit Edison's affairs throughout its entire corporate existence. In view of the close
association between North American and Mr. Dow in the formation of Detroit Edison,
this would appear to be a fact very damaging to petitioner's case. However, persons
who are acquainted with Mr. Dow assure me that he is not a man to be "controlled"
by anyone and that if any "influence" is exerted between Detroit Edison and North
American, it moves from Mr. Dow to North American rather than in the other
direction.
10
Matter of Community Gas & Power Co., 7 S. E. C. 643 (1940); Matter of
Associated General Utilities Co., 4 S. E. C. 526 (1939); Matter of Employees Welfare Assn., 4 S. E. C. 792 (1939).
11
Matter of Lehigh Power Securities Corp., 5 S. E. C. 143 (1939).
12
Matter of Federal Light & Traction Co., 5 S. E. C. 140 (1939) (two cases).
111
Matter of Reading. Gas Co., 7 S. E. C. 7 55 ( I 940) ; Matter of Halsey, Stuart
& Co., 1 S. E. C. 323 (1936); Matter of Irving Trust Co., I S. E. C. 273 (1936).
14 Secs. 2 (a) (7) (B), (iii) and 2 (a) (8) (B) (iii) of the act.
15
Matter of Italian Superpower Corp., 1 S. E. C. 282 (1936). The subsidiary
was partly owned and entirely controlled by the Kingdom of Italy.
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In certain situations "controlling influence," having once existed,
has been destroyed, as was attempted in the principal case. Thus where
petitioner owned all the stock of two operating utilities but transferred
the voting rights in connection with the lease of certain mines, petitioner
was exempted under section 2 (a) (7) (B),16 and the operating utilities were declared not to be subsidiary companies.11 And where either
the parent or subsidiary is in the process of reorganization which will
result in the cancellation of the equities of the present stockholders,
together with the "controlling influence" of the parent company, exemption from the provisions of the act has been granted.18 It has been
held that an operating utility may be simultaneously the subsidiary
of three different companies.19 In this case there was no express agreement or contract but officers of all three parents were also officers of
the subsidiary. In another case where three companies owned an operating utility in about the same ratio but the subsidiary company was
economically dependent upon one of the three, which bought ninetyfive per cent of the subsidiary's output, it was held that the operating
subsidiary was not a subsidiary of one of the other two companies.20
In one case a company successfully accomplished what was attempted in the principal case. There the holding company liquidated
its stock and systematically weeded out interlocking directors and officers until there was not even the suspicion of "controlling influence." 21
Before attempting to draw any conclusions from the above cases let
us look at the same problem in connection with another phase of regulation attempted under the act.
2..

Matter of Dayton Power & Light Company 22
This proceeding arose under the old Rule U-!2.F-2 of the commission.28 In 1940 Dayton Power & Light proposed to issue $25,000,000 in refunding bonds. Morgan Stanley & Co. was selected to
16

Matter of Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp., l S. E. C •. 374 (1936).
Matter of Cresson Electric Light Co., 1 S. E. C. 379 (1936). This order was
so framed that it must be periodically renewed.
18
Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., 3 S. E. C. 672 (1938); Matter of Boise
Gas Light & Coke Co., 2 S. E. C. 269 (1937).
19
Matter of Northern Natural Gas Co., 5 S. E. C. 228 (1939).
20 Matter of Chicago District Electric Generating Corp., 2 S. E. C. IO (1937).
Commissioner Douglas dissented.
21 Matter of International Paper & Power Co., 4 S. E. C. 873 (1939).
22
Holding Company Act, Release No. 2654 (1941).
28 The rule, in substance, provided that no underwriter's fees should be paid to
any person who stood in such relation to the person by whom the fee was to be paid
"that there is liable to be or to have been an absence of arm's-length bargaining with
respect to the transaction." Counsel for the Dayton and Morgan Stanley interests raised
serious questions as to the validity of this rule. As these questions are immaterial to the
present purpose, they will not be discussed.
17
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head the underwriting group. Dayton Power & Light applied to the
commission for an exemption from the provisions of section 6 (a) of
the act. 24 The commission on its own motion issued an order to show
cause why Rule U-r2F-2 did not bar the payment of underwriting fees.
At the subsequent hearing it developed that there was no evidence
of any agreement, collusion, or intangible relationship between Morgan
Stanley and Dayton.25 So, in denying the underwriting fees to Morgan
Stanley, the commission relied upon a circle of past and present relationship, both intercorporate and personal, that is all but nebulous.
Briefly summarized, the facts upon which the decision rested are these:
In r928 J.P. Morgan & Co. caused the formation of The United
Corporation, a public utility holding company. United owns r9.6 per
cent of the stock of the Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation. Thus
Columbia is a statutory subsidiary of United under section 2 (a) (8)
(A) of the act. Columbia in turn owns one hundred per cent of Dayton.
Due to the Federal Banking Act of r933,26 it became impossible for
J.P. Morgan & Co. to continue in the investment banking business. So
in r935, when investment banking again appeared to be profitable,
certain Morgan partners resigned from J. P. Morgan & Co. and
formed Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley's capital structure consisted of $7,000,000 of six per cent nonvoting preferred stock and
$500,000 common stock. Immediately after Morgan Stanley's organization, individual J. P. Morgan partners held $6,600,000 of its
preferred stock. At the time of the hearing this amount liad been reduced
to $3,580,000 or 35.8 per cent of Morgan Stanley's total capitalization. Morgan Stanley officers and directors hold securities representing
42.5 per cent of Morgan Stanley's capitalization. But it is essential to
remember that all voting securities are held by Morgan Stanley's officers and directors.
These are the essential and underlying facts upon which the decision was based. From them the commission found that J.P. Morgan
had a financial interest in the success of Morgan Stanley, that J. P.
Morgan dictated to United, which dictated to Columbia, which die24

Sec. 6 (a) of the act forbids the issuance of securities unless certain formalities
provided for in § 7 have been taken with the approval of the commission as required
by § 7. Under § 6 (b) an exemption may be granted from the prohibition contained
in § 6 (a) when the funds realized from the sale of proposed securities are to be used
solely for the purpose of financing the securities of the subsidiary company.
25
The writer has not seen the record of the proceedings, But the writer has had
opportunity to examine the briefs submitted on behalf of Dayton and Morgan Stanley.
Since these briefs were prepared by counsel of unimpeachable integrity, a reliance
thereon seems justified. The statement instantly footnoted is substantiated by those
briefs and is not contradicted in the report of the commission.
26
48 Stat. L. 165 (1933), 12 U.S. C. (1934), § 335.
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tated to Dayton. Therefore the commission found that there was
likely to have been an absence of arm's length bargaining.
As pointed out in the briefs by Dayton's counsel, if one link in the
above chain of relationship is broken, the whole chain falls. Let us
examine each link briefly.
(a) J.P. Morgan-Morgan Stanley Relations. This seems to be the
most substantial link of the chain and it is weak enough. Certain members of the Morgan firm have a personal financial interest in Morgan
Stanley's business success because of their preferred holdings. Any
actual influence exerted by J.P. Morgan upon Morgan Stanley must
rest upon the intangible factor of former ~usiness associations between
the officers of both firms because, it must be remembered, the Morgan
Stanley stock which is held by J.P. Morgan officers is nonvoting.
(b) J. P. Morgan-United Relations. In its opinion the commission quotes Representative Rayburn as follows:
"· .• the banking houses control the holding companies which
control the operating companies. One big banking house, through
a company called 'United Corporation,' has an arrangement by
which 8 or IO of these big holding companies are tied together,
so that more than one-fourth of the electric-light companies in
the entire United States are subject to that banking influence." 27
At one time this statement was probably reasonably accurate. J.P. Morgan & Co. did organize United in 1928.28 Immediately after its organization, J.P. Morgan & Co. held about one-third of United's stock. By
1929, however, this had been reduced to 3.5 per cent and its reduction
was continued until in 1939 J.P. Morgan & Co. held less than onehalf of one per cent of United's voting securities. At this time the St.
Regis Paper Co. held 7.9 per cent of United's voting securities, American Superpower Corp. held 6.2 per cent, and Commercial Enterprises
Corp. l per cent. In 1939 the Morgan holdings of United's preferred
securities were negligible. Since March of 1938 no officer of J. P.
Morgan or of Morgan Stanley has been officially connected with United
Corporation. Mr. Whitney, a Morgan partner, served on United's
board until 1938. He has been consulted by Mr. Howard, a United
director, once since 1938, when Mr. Howard desired advice in connection with certain United affairs. At no time have J. P. Morgan
partners ever constituted a majority of United's board.
(c) United-Columbia and Dayton Relations. The relations be27 Matter of Dayton Power & Light Co., S. E. C. Holding Company Act Release
No. 2654 at p. 29 (1941). This quotation from Rayburn is found in 79 CoNG. REc.
10318 (1935).
28
For the detailed history of United's organization, see 37 CoL. L. REv. 785, 936
(1937).
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tween United and Columbia and between Columbia and Dayton may
be tersely stated by saying that United owns r9.6 per cent of Columbia
and Columbia owns one hundred per cent of Dayton. Formerly there
were directors and officers of United who were also directors and officers of Columbia, but there have been no such intercorporate tie-ups
since before Morgan Stanley was organized. At the hearing there was
uncontradicted testimony to the effect that United never attempted
to influence Columbia policies. Likewise there was uncontradicted evidence to the effect that Columbia did not interfere in the corporate
affairs of Dayton, but due to the fact that Dayton is a one hundred
per cent subsidiary of Columbia this point was not seriously relied upon.
The facts set forth above are not a detailed statement of all the
facts shown, but they are the basic and fundamental facts upon which
the commission rested its holding. They form a chain by which it was
found that there was likely to have been an absence of arm's length
bargaining between Dayton and Morgan Stanley. It is significant to
notice that in each link the control of the one corporation over the other
must rest upon the fact that the officers of both corporations have been
close friends, or have long done business with each other. In no link,
with the single exception of that between Columbia and Dayton, did
one corporation dominate the other financially, or by tangible methods.
As to the control exercised over Columbia by United, the commission,
after pointing out that under the act Columbia was a United subsidiary
because United owned more than ten per cent of Columbia's stock, said:
"By reason of the status of Dayton and Columbia as subsidiaries of United, therefore, it follows as a matter of course
that a person influential in the financial affairs of United would
also stand in a similar relationship to United's subsidiaries...." 29
This simply is not true. The fact that a subsidiary is such for purposes
of the act does not connote that the parent dominates the subsidiary.
The commission should be the first to concede this proposition, since it
has itself declared one utility to be simultaneously the subsidiary of
three companies 30 and it is a long-established principle that "no man
can serve two masters," much less serve three.
·
It is submitted that the commission based its decision not upon
what was proved but upon what was suspected because of the past
history of the corporations involved. It will be conceded that at one
time J.P. Morgan & Co. did control United and that United exerted
strong influence on Columbia. But from reading the facts as stated
29

Matter of Dayton Power & Light Co., S. E. C. Holding Company Act Release
No. 2654 at p. 5 (1941) (italics supplied).
80
Matter of Northern Natural Gas Co., 5 S. E. C. 228 (1939).
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by the commission, one concludes that these corporations had made an
honest effort to remove that influence. The commission's finding that
they failed indicates that, once such influence has existed, nothing
short of the parent company's sale of the subsidiary's stock will serve
to remove that influence, and that even then the commission may find
that the influence continues.
The instant case is rendered more ridiculous by the fact that in this
case it was proved that the parties actually did deal at "arm's length"
and that Dayton drove a hard bargain. In mentioning the latter fact
the commission said:
" ... we recognize that the prices of 104 to the public and 102¼
to the company were not discernibly out of line with the prevailing market, and the spread of I¾ for the underwriters was among
the lowest of those taken on comparable public utility issues
during the last five years. Of course most of these negotiations
took place while the hearings in this proceeding were being conducted, and that circumstance must have affected the outcome." 81
Thus the commission found that there was likely to have been an absence of arm's-length barganining despite the fact that there was no
such absence. 32
The effect of the instant decision would seem to be that the utility
and its underwriter must deal at arm's length, and take the chances that
the commission will view the negotiations with suspicion.

3.
The question in the Dayton case was whether the negotiations with
the underwriters were under such circumstances that there was likely
to have been an absence of arms-length bargaining. In the last analysis
this can only mean that the question was whether either the utility or
the underwriter exerted a controlling influence over the other or
whether some outside organization or person exerted a controlling
influence over both. Thus we return again to the question which was
raised at the beginning, namely, what is a controlling influence? One
is tempted to answer glibly that a controlling influence is whatever
the commission says it is, but such an answer, while reasonably accurate,
is worthless.
31

Matter of Dayton Power & Light Co., S. E. C. Holding Company Act Release
No. 2654 at p. 21 (1941).
82
The commission itself seems to have recognized some of the shortcomings of
Rule U-12F-2, for that rule has been abolished and in its place has been substituted
Rule U-50. The new rule requires competitive bidding for the underwriting of
securities of public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries.
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While the term as interpreted by the commission is indefinite, it is
possible to make certain generalizations in regard to "controlling influence." Controlling influence exists where two corporations have interlocking directorates, even though the directors who serve on both
boards are much less than a majority of either; it exists where one
company is financially dependent upon the other. Where it has once
existed it is almost presumed to exist unless it can be proven beyond
the shadow of suspicion that it no longer exists.38 Past intercorporate
relations are a factor to be considered in determining whether a controlling influence exists. The commission lays such weight upon past
control (prior to the act) that they all but visit the sins of the fathers
upon the children. The likelihood of the exercise of future influence is
also a factor to be considered. Likewise the friendship and business confidence which the officers of the two corporations place in each other
may result in a finding that a controlling influence exists. This seems
to the writer to be particularly unreasonable.
In the opinion of the writer the term "controlling influence" has
been consistently interpreted by the commission to mean "influence"
only. Certainly the word "controlling" has not been given its ordinary significance. In making this interpretation the commission has
sacrificed the desirable course of giving the act a literal interpretation
and has exercised its discretion to foster what it believes to be the economic policy underlying the act. It is submitted that such a course is
of questionable soundness.
Smith Warder
88 In their brief, counsel for Dayton Power & Light vigorously attacked this
premise and the commission avoided a statement of this doctrine in so many words.

